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THE SECRETS WE KEEP. . . :
ENCRYPTION AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
SOFTWARE VULNERABILITY DISCLOSURE
REFORM
Ian Williams*
Vulnerabilities within pieces of software can expose otherwise secure
data to outside parties. Such vulnerabilities are exploited not just by
malicious actors looking to exploit secured data for criminal reasons,
but also by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Government
agencies have cultivated vulnerabilities as investigative tools and
cyber weapons, and at times keep the vulnerabilities they have
discovered secret from both the companies that produced the software
and the consumers who rely upon it. While the US Government has
created a vulnerability disclosure system to help decide when to keep a
vulnerability secret, it does not do enough to balance the government’s
national security and law enforcement interests with the data security
interests of the public. As debates over government access to encrypted
data continue, a strong legal framework for deciding when and how
government actors can keep vulnerabilities secret must be established.

I. Introduction
Like any product created by humans, software is never perfect. Imperfections in a piece of software can affect a program in a myriad of ways, but
few are more problematic than those that affect the security of a computer
program or system. In computer security, these “software vulnerabilities”
are defined as any “programming mistake that allows an adversary access”
1
into a computer system. With knowledge of a vulnerability, malicious ac-

*
Fellow for the Law & Mobility Program, University of Michigan Law School. J.D.
2018, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Gautam Hans, not only for shepherding the initial research that lead to this piece, but for being a friend and mentor. Thank
you also to Professor Evan Caminker, for his notes and guidance. Finally, thank you to the
staff of MTLR, for overlooking my tyrannical reign as their EIC when they agreed to continue
working with me and publish this piece.
This piece was originally written in December of 2017. It is a snapshot of the discussed
issues at that time—unfortunately technology often moves quickly, and there are developments in both case law and public policy since that time that are left undiscussed. Readers are
encouraged to use this note as a primer for their own exploration of these issues.
1.
Bruce Schneier, Disclosing vs. Hoarding Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(May
22,
2014,
6:15
AM),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/05/
disclosing_vs_h.html.

105

106

Michigan Technology Law Review

[Vol. 25:105

tors can create “exploits,” pieces of software that use a given vulnerability
to their own advantage, often to circumvent standard security measures like
2
passwords or encryption and provide a backdoor into a system. The closest
most users will get to these vulnerabilities is when they download updates to
their programs, many of which are “patches” intended to fix vulnerabilities.
Of course, depending on the age and sophistication of the system, patching
vulnerabilities can be difficult and often requires some effort on the part of
3
developers and users to be effective. Often, however, the biggest stumbling
block on the path toward fixing a vulnerability is not designing a patch or
convincing end users to download updates, but rather is finding out the vulnerability exists in the first place. Vulnerabilities that have yet to be discovered by a program’s developer or end user are known as “zero-day vulnerabilities,” as the developer in question has had zero days to patch the problem
and users have equally had zero days to implement the patch or other pro4
tective moves.
Developers are naturally keen to find and patch such zero-day vulnerabilities and often rely on security researchers and “white hat” hackers to as5
sist in that work. To entice third-parties to help find vulnerabilities, many
developers and organizations sponsor “bug bounties,” with the promise of
fame (via public credit for finding the issue) and fortune (via hard cash or
items of value like frequent flyer miles) for those who uncover vulnerabili6
ties. In 2017 alone, bug bounty payouts totaled more than $6 million, a
7
211% increase from the total payouts in 2016, and bug bounty programs
8
had been launched not only by major tech companies like Google, Mi-

2.
Dave Piscitello, Threats, Vulnerabilities and Exploits—oh my!, ICANN: BLOG
(Aug. 10, 2015), https://www.icann.org/news/blog/threats-vulnerabilities-and-exploits-oh-my
(“Not all exploits involve software, and it’s incorrect to classify all exploit-based attacks as
hacking. Scams - socially engineering an individual or employee into disclosing personal or
sensitive information - are an age-old kind of exploit that does not require hacking skills.”).
3.
Steven M. Bellovin, Patching is Hard, SMBLOG (May 12, 2017),
https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/blog//2017-05/2017-05-12.html.
4.
ARI SCHWARTZ & ROB KNAKE, GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN VULNERABILITY
DISCLOSURE
3
(2016),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/
vulnerability-disclosure-web-final3.pdf [hereinafter SCHWARTZ & KNAKE].
5.
See G. Burningham, The Rise of White Hat Hackers and the Bug Bounty Ecosystem, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 31, 2016, 1:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/white-hathackers-keep-bug-bounty-421357.html.
6.
BUGCROWD INC., THE STATE OF THE BUG BOUNTY 4 (June 2016),
https://ww2.bugcrowd.com/rs/453-IJC-858/images/state-of-bug-bounty-2016.pdf?utm_
source=website&utm_medium=resources_page&utm_content=state-of-bug-bounty-2016.
7.
BUGCROWD INC., 2017 STATE OF THE BUG BOUNTY REPORT 1 (2017),
https://ww2.bugcrowd.com/rs/453-IJC-858/images/Bugcrowd-2017-State-of-Bug-BountyReport.pdf?utm_source=website&utm_medium=resources_page&utm_content=Bugcrowd2017-State-of-Bug-Bounty-Report.
8.
Google Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) Rules, GOOGLE APPLICATION
SECURITY, https://www.google.com/about/appsecurity/reward-program/ (last visited Dec. 20,
2017).
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11

crosoft, Facebook, and PayPal but also “real-world” companies like
12
United Airlines. In 2016, the Department of Defense ran a pilot program
bug bounty that “exceeded all expectations,” with 138 unique vulnerabilities
13
being discovered within the Department’s computer systems. These programs are part of a greater vulnerability disclosure ecosystem that includes
14
paid bounties and other unpaid reporting schemes.
Zero-day vulnerabilities have also attracted interest from civilian government actors, as they offer a valuable tool for criminal investigations and
espionage. The utility of these vulnerabilities leaves governments in a precarious situation—should they protect end users by revealing the vulnerabilities, thereby allowing developers to patch them, or should they keep them
secret to serve the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies? By
keeping a zero-day vulnerability secret, government agencies can retain
them as novel means of accessing a suspect or intelligence target’s computer, as a target will be unaware that any security flaw exists. In August of
2016, the precarious nature of this situation played out in full view of the
public, as a group of hackers calling themselves the “Shadow Brokers” be15
gan advertising that it had stolen a number of exploits from the NSA. In
May of 2017 some of those exploits were used (possibly by North Korean
hackers) as part of the “WannaCry” ransomware attack that struck at com16
puters worldwide. The situation was further complicated in November of
2017, when the White House released details on a new “Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process” (VEP) for the US government, detailing how and
when vulnerabilities discovered by government entities would be made pub17
lic.
The fight over vulnerability disclosure plays out across the backdrop of
a long-running debate over government access to secured information. As
9.
Microsoft Bug Bounty Program, MICROSOFT, https://technet.microsoft.com/en-US/
security/dn425036 (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
10.
Information, FACEBOOK (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/whitehat.
11.
PayPal Bug Bounty Program, PAYPAL, https://www.paypal.com/us/webapps/mpp/
security-tools/reporting-security-issues (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
12.
United Airlines bug bounty program, UNITED, https://www.united.com/web/enUS/content/contact/bugbounty.aspx (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
13.
HACK THE PENTAGON, HACKERONE, https://www.hackerone.com/resources/
hack-the-pentagon (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
14.
See Bug Bounty List, BUGCROWD, https://www.bugcrowd.com/bug-bounty-list/
(last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
15.
Bruce Schneier, Who Are the Shadow Brokers?, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/05/shadow-brokers/527778/.
16.
See Olivia Solon, WannaCry ransomware has links to North Korea, cybersecurity
experts say, GUARDIAN (May 15, 2017, 6:58 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2017/may/15/wannacry-ransomware-north-korea-lazarus-group.
17.
See THE WHITE HOUSE, Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United
States Government (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/
images/External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF
[hereinafter
2017 VEP].
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computer security and encryption have grown stronger, the US government
has sought means to break that security and retain the access to communications (for both intelligence purposes and criminal investigation) that it had
in the pre-digital era. In the 1990s, this played out in the “Crypto Wars,” a
series of policy and legal battles between the government and technology
advocates, which ended with the government loosening restrictions on cryptographic technology and abandoning attempts to force hardware developers
18
to include government backdoors into their products. However, as encryp19
tion technology has become more advanced and more commonplace, fig20
21
ures in the law enforcement and intelligence communities have begun to
raise the issue of requiring backdoors once more.
The issues around vulnerability disclosures and government backdoors
are complicated and expansive, and it would be presumptuous, if not foolhardy, to claim this paper will cover them all. What it will do is look at
these two important issues through the lens of two recent court cases to see
how these issues have begun to play out in the legal system. Part I will expand on the issues of vulnerability disclosure and use by government and
explore what implications those issues have on prosecutions by looking at
the Playpen cases—where the FBI used a software vulnerability within the
Firefox browser to hack into a website distributing child pornography. Part
II will then explore the San Bernardino iPhone case, where the FBI attempted to force Apple into creating a backdoor into the iPhone’s encryption and
the case’s relationship to the greater debate over government-mandated
backdoors. Part III will explore recently enacted and proposed solutions to
these conflicts, including the new VEP. Finally, Part IV will propose a hybrid solution that attempts to provide a balance between the competing interests involved.

18.
DANIELLE KEHL ET AL., DOOMED TO REPEAT HISTORY? LESSONS FROM THE
CRYPTO WARS OF THE 1990S 1 (June 2015), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3407doomed-to-repeat-history-lessons-from-the-crypto-wars-of-the-1990s/
Crypto%20Wars_ReDo.7cb491837ac541709797bdf868d37f52.pdf.
19.
See, e.g., Joe Miller, Google and Apple to Introduce Default Encryption, BBC
NEWS (Sept.19, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-29276955.
20.
James B. Comey, Director, FBI, Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public
Safety on a Collison Course?, Remarks to the Brookings Institution (Oct. 16, 2014),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-ona-collision-course.
21.
See Tom McCarthy, NSA Director Defends Plan to Maintain ‘Backdoors’ into
Technology Companies, GUARDIAN (Feb. 23, 2015, 3:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
us-news/2015/feb/23/nsa-director-defends-backdoors-into-technology-companies.
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II. Vulnerability Disclosures, Government Stockpiles, and the
Playpen Cases
The pursuit and exploitation of vulnerabilities have existed since the
dawn of the modern era of computing. In 1988, the “Morris Worm” became
the first publicized use of a computer worm (a program that copies itself
from computer to computer), and it was able to infect about 6,000 of the
22
60,000 hosts linked to the then-nascent internet. At the time, network administrators did little to protect their systems and gave little thought to
23
online attacks. The worm’s architect, a Cornell graduate student named
Robert Morris, had created the worm not out of malice, but rather intellectual curiosity, though that did not stop him from becoming the first person
24
prosecuted under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).
The Morris Worm was a wakeup call to both industry and government
that malicious actors could exploit software vulnerabilities to weaken or
break computer networks. In November of 1988 the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Carnegie Mellon University formed
the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERTCC), which continues to this day to alert “U.S. industry and computer users
worldwide to potential threats to the security of their systems” and provide
25
“information about how to avoid, minimize, or recover from the damage.”
Private industry likewise saw the necessity of pursuing vulnerabilities, with
26
Netscape launching the first bug bounty program in 1995.
As more researchers began to hunt for vulnerabilities, experts began
developing three general categories governing when and to whom a vulnerability should be revealed:
x

Full disclosure—Full details are released [publicly] as soon as
possible, often without vendor involvement

x

Coordinated disclosure—Researcher and vendor work together
so that the bug is fixed before the vulnerability is disclosed

22.
See Timeline of Computer History—1988, COMPUTER HISTORY MUSEUM,
http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/1988/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
23.
See Timothy B. Lee, How a Grad Student Trying to Build the First
Botnet
Brought
the
Internet
to
its
Knees,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
1,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2013/11/01/
how-a-grad-student-trying-to-build-the-first-botnet-brought-the-internet-to-its-knees/?utm_
term=.fa24b99bbb89.
24.
See id.
25.
Byron Spice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Partnership with
Carnegie Mellon’s CERT Coordination Center, CARNEGIE MELLON U. (Sept. 15, 2003),
https://www.cs.cmu.edu/news/us-department-homeland-security-announces-partnershipcarnegie-mellons-cert-coordination-center.
26.
See Esben Friis-Jensen, The History of Bug Bounty Programs, COBALT (Apr. 10,
2014), https://blog.cobalt.io/the-history-of-bug-bounty-programs-50def4dcaab3.
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Private or Non-Disclosure—The vulnerability is released to a
27
small group of people (not the vendor) or kept private

Upon discovering a vulnerability, a researcher can choose to release its details on their own (full disclosure), work with the software’s vendor to fix
the problem before making it public, or can choose to keep the information
to itself, the latter of which (unless the vulnerability is later discovered by
the vendor) leaves users at risk. From these three basic categories developers and corporations have spun a diverse web of policies, each with unique
28
requirements and timetables.

A. Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process
From 1988 and onward the government remained involved in publicfacing vulnerability disclosure via CERT-CC, but it would not be until 2008
29
that the national security apparatus began to give the issue any attention.
On January 8, 2008, President George W. Bush signed National Security
Presidential Directive 54 (NSPD-54), which was intended to give direction
30
for federal cybersecurity operations. This order led to the development of
the “Commercial and Government Information Technology and Industrial
Control Product or System Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process”
(VEP), a policy detailed in a document dated February 16, 2010, which was
31
only partially declassified to the public in January of 2016. The 2010 VEP
applied to vulnerabilities that were “newly discovered and not publicly
32
known,” and did not apply to vulnerabilities discovered in the course of
33
open and unclassified research. The policy noted that “the discovery of
vulnerabilities ‘may present competing equities for [US government] offen34
sive and defensive mission interests,’ ” and thus “actions taken in response
to knowledge of a specific vulnerability must be coordinated to ensure the
35
needs of each of these ‘equities’ are addressed.” When a government entity identifies a vulnerability, the entity is tasked with reporting it to the “Executive Secretariat,” a position assigned to the National Security Agency
27.
Brad Antoniewicz, Approaches to Vulnerability Disclosure, OPEN SECURITY RES.
(June 24, 2014), http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2014/06/approaches-to-vulnerabilitydisclosure.html.
28.
See id.
29.
SCHWARTZ & KNAKE, supra note 4, at 4.
30.
See National Security Presidential Directive, NSPD-54 (Jan. 8, 2008),
https://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/EPIC-FOIA-NSPD54.pdf.
31.
See EFF v. NSA, ODNI—Vulnerabilities FOIA, EFF, https://www.eff.org/
cases/eff-v-nsa-odni-vulnerabilities-foia (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
32.
COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRIAL
CONTROL PRODUCT OR SYSTEM VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS 5 (Feb.
16, 2010), https://www.eff.org/document/vulnerabilities-equities-process-january-2016.
33.
Id. at 4.
34.
Id. at 2.
35.
Id.
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36

Information Assurance Directorate. The Executive Secretariat facilitates
the flow of information about the new vulnerability to VEP “Points of Con37
tact” within a number of government agencies. If these agencies believe
they have an equity at stake in the vulnerability, they will then take part, via
subject matter experts assigned by each agency, in a multiagency discussion
regarding the vulnerability, which will then lead to a recommendation to an
38
39
Equities Review Board (another multiagency body).
The 2010 VEP report, and the secret process it created, began to come
to light in 2014 after the public exposure of a major encryption vulnerability. In April of that year, computer security researchers revealed that a major
security vulnerability, which they named “Heartbleed,” existed within the
40
OpenSSL software that many websites used to encrypt traffic. The vulnerability exploited the connection process between a computer and an encrypted website, allowing hackers to bleed off data (including passwords
41
and usernames) from what should have been secure systems. News reports
began to circulate that the NSA had been aware of the vulnerability for two
years, based on unnamed sources who claimed the vulnerability had become
a “basic part of the agency’s toolkit for stealing account passwords and oth42
er common tasks.” The controversy led the Obama Administration to publicize the existence of the VEP, admitting that “building up a huge stockpile
of undisclosed vulnerabilities while leaving the Internet vulnerable and the
American people unprotected would not be in our national security inter43
est.” They even provided a list of questions typically asked when considering the withholding of a vulnerability:
x

How much is the vulnerable system used in the core internet infrastructure, in other critical infrastructure systems, in the U.S.
economy, and/or in national security systems?

x

Does the vulnerability, if left unpatched, impose significant
risk?

Id. at 3–5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 7.
Kim Zetter, Has the NSA Been Using the Heartbleed Bug as an Internet Peephole?,
WIRED (Apr. 10, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/04/nsa-heartbleed/.
41.
Id.
42.
Kim Zetter, Report: NSA Exploited Heartbleed to Siphon Passwords for Two Years,
WIRED (Apr. 11, 2014, 4:57 PM), https://www.wired.com/2014/04/nsa-exploited-heartbleedtwo-years/.
43.
Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabilities, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
blog/2014/04/28/heartbleed-understanding-when-we-disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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x

How much harm could an adversary nation or criminal group
do with knowledge of this vulnerability?

x

How likely is it that we would know if someone else was exploiting it?

x

How badly do we need the intelligence we think we can get
from exploiting the vulnerability?

x

Are there other ways we can get it?

x

Could we utilize the vulnerability for a short period of time before we disclose it?

x

How likely is it that someone else will discover the vulnerability?

x

Can the vulnerability be patched or otherwise mitigated?

44

The White House further stated that the process was “biased toward respon45
sibly disclosing the vulnerability.” They did not, however, release the 2010
VEP document, which was released only after a FOIA request and legal battle between the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the NSA, and the Of46
fice of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI).
In 2016, the danger of vulnerability stockpiles became painfully clear,
as a major security breach by a hacker organization called the “Shadow
47
Brokers” released NSA-held vulnerabilities across the internet. The Shadow Brokers released several different caches of NSA exploits, which target48
ed network routers, email servers, and the Windows operating system. The
Microsoft exploits were mainly older vulnerabilities, many of which had already been patched, though they would still be of use against unpatched sys49
tems. The leak of these tools threw the NSA into turmoil, as the agency
struggled to rebuild its arsenal while investigating the source of the leaked

44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
EFF v. NSA, ODNI—Vulnerabilities, FOIA, supra note 31.
47.
See Schneier, supra note 15.
48.
Id.
49.
Tim Cushing, Latest Exploit Dump by Shadow Brokers Contains
Easy-to-Use Windows Exploits, Most Already Patched by Microsoft, TECHDIRT
(Apr. 17, 2017, 3:22 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20170416/08190937159/
latest-exploit-dump-shadow-brokers-contains-easy-to-use-windows-exploits-most-alreadypatched-microsoft.shtml.
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50

materials. Then, in May of 2017, one of the vulnerabilities included in the
Shadow Broker’s leaks was used to launch “WannaCry,” a massive, world51
wide cyber-attack. The vulnerability was used to spread “ransomware,” a
type of malicious software, which held computers hostage until their owners
52
paid the hackers to release them. In a further blow to the NSA, researchers
found signs that the attack was launched by North Korean hackers, using the
NSA’s own tools, though there was no evidence of North Korean involve53
ment in the original theft of the hacking tools. The incident prompted Microsoft to publicly criticize government stockpiling of vulnerabilities, com54
paring the leak of the NSA tools to the theft of Tomahawk cruise missiles.

B. The Playpen Cases: Vulnerability Disclosure and
Criminal Investigations
While the national security side of vulnerability disclosures has received the bulk of public and press attention, the issue of government-held
vulnerabilities has also appeared in a series of criminal cases tied to a 2015
FBI operation to shut down a child pornography distribution website named
Playpen. First created in August of 2014, the site had 60,000 member ac55
counts within a month, booming to 215,000 accounts by 2015. Acting on a
tip from a foreign law enforcement agency, the FBI began to investigate
Playpen and eventually secured a warrant to seize control of the site’s server. With the server under their control, the FBI allowed the site to continue
operation for almost two weeks, between February 20th and March 4th,
2015, before finally taking it down. During that period the FBI received a
second warrant authorizing it to send malware (called a “Network Investiga50.
See Scott Shane et al., Security Breach and Spilled Secrets Have Shaken the N.S.A.
to Its Core, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/12/us/
nsa-shadow-brokers.html.
51.
See Ian Sherr, WannaCry Ransomware: Everything You Need to Know,
CNET
(May
19,
2017,
12:29
PM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/wannacry-wannacrypt-uiwix-ransomware-everything-you-needto-know/.
52.
See Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, In Computer Attacks, Clues Point to Frequent Culprit: North Korea, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/
15/us/nsa-hacking-shadow-brokers.html.
53.
Id.
54.
Brad Smith, The Need For Urgent Collective Action to Keep People Safe Online:
Lessons from Last Week’s Cyberattack, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES
(May
14,
2017),
https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/needurgent-collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/?tduid=
(29c8620bd207948d693e858a037b4a00)(256380)(2459594)(nOD_rLJHOacQBTAt391V._e5aR84aLD.Q)()#sm.001c8i11317l0f3vs2f1cm2qoliu3?ranMID=24542&ranE
AID=nOD%2FrLJHOac&ranSiteID=nOD_rLJHOac-QBTAt391V._e5aR84aLD.Q.
55.
Joseph Cox, The FBI’s ‘Unprecedented’ Hacking Campaign Targeted
Over a Thousand Computers, MOTHERBOARD (Jan. 4, 2016, 4:00 PM),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/the-fbis-unprecedented-hacking-campaigntargeted-over-a-thousand-computers.
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56

tion Technique” (NIT)) through the site to anyone who visited the site. It is
believed the NIT exploited a vulnerability in the code of the Firefox Browser, as bundled within the Tor Browser (a browser used to surf the web
57
anonymously). Any computer that visited Playpen would be infected with
the NIT, which was able to search infected computers for identifying infor58
mation, including the computers’ IP addresses. Once investigators obtained the IP addresses, they subpoenaed ISPs to learn the names and addresses of the individuals associated with the given IPs. They secured search
warrants for those individuals and carried out numerous searches and sei59
zures. Overall, the Playpen investigation was a massive success, leading to
350 arrests, as well as the prosecution of 25 producers of child pornography,
51 hands-on abusers, and the identification or rescue of 55 children in the
60
US alone.
As the Playpen cases came to trial, however, questions began to arise
about the NIT itself. Defendants and their attorneys wanted to know more
about the malware that had been used to identify them. United States v.
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash.), a case in the Western District of Washington, became a focal point of the issue, as the Defendant
fought for the chance to examine the code of the NIT. Michaud, a former
school district administration worker, was arrested after the NIT gave the
61
FBI evidence that he had accessed the Playpen site. In court, the Judge
showed an inclination toward disclosure, commenting at one point that,
“much of the details of this information is lost on me, I am afraid, the technical parts of it, but it comes down to a simple thing. . . . You say you
caught me by the use of computer hacking, so how do you do it? How do
62
you do it? A fair question.” After hearing arguments from both sides, the
court had to admit it was trapped in a catch-22, noting, “the defendant has
the right to review the full N.I.T. code, but the government does not have to
63
produce it[.]”
56.
The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, EFF, https://www.eff.org/pages/
playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions#whathappened (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
57.
Id.
58.
See ‘Playpen’ Creator Sentenced to 30 Years, FBI (May 5, 2017),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/playpen-creator-sentenced-to-30-years.
59.
See id.
60.
Id.
61.
See Cyrus Farivar, Feds May Let Playpen Child Porn Suspect Go to Keep Concealing Their Source Code, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 9, 2017, 4:39 PM), https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2017/01/feds-may-let-playpen-child-porn-suspect-go-to-keep-concealing-their-sourcecode/.
62.
Joseph Cox, Transcript Shows Why a Judge Ordered the FBI to Reveal Its Mass
Hacking Malware, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 24, 2016, 12:30 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/
en_us/article/transcript-shows-why-a-judge-ordered-the-fbi-to-reveal-mass-hacking-malwareplaypen-jay-michaud.
63.
Order on Procedural History and Case Status in Advance of May 25, 2016 Hearing
at 5, United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 18, 2016).
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Michaud’s defense highlighted the fact that in a similar 2013 case, the
FBI had been extremely cooperative in revealing details on a different
64
NIT. After continued debate the District Court finally ruled that the evi65
dence based on the NIT was inadmissible. While the US Attorney pursued
an appeal of that order with the Ninth Circuit, the FBI classified “portions of
the tool, the exploits used in connection with the tool, and some of the oper66
ational aspects of the tool.” In December of 2016 the government dropped
the appeal citing “further review within the Department of Justice [of] the
67
Court’s order and the record in the case.” Finally, in March of 2017 the
government dismissed the indictment, stating it had to “choose between disclosure of classified information and dismissal of [the] indictment,” and
given that “disclosure is not currently an option,” the case had to be
68
dropped.
Given that the NIT in question involved their product, Mozilla, the
creators of the Firefox browser, sought to intervene in the Michaud case.
Following the Court’s first order compelling the government to provide the
code of the NIT, Mozilla filed a motion to intervene or appear as amicus cu69
riae in relation to the government’s motion to reconsider. Citing reason to
believe the NIT’s exploit involved “a previously unknown and potentially
still active vulnerability” in Firefox, Mozilla argued the vulnerability could
put the security of millions of users at risk, and they asked the court to order
the government to disclose the vulnerability to it before turning it over to
70
the defendant. In their brief Mozilla also noted that the government had
71
refused to tell it if the vulnerability in question had gone through the VEP.
In the end, the Court denied the motion, effectively telling Mozilla to seek
72
answers from the government directly. Unable to gain information about
the vulnerability in their product via the courts, Mozilla chose to put its

64.
Declaration of Matthew Miller at 4, United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2016).
65.
Order Denying Dismissal and Excluding Evidence at 1, United States v. Jay
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2016).
66.
Government’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Compel at 22 n.8, United States
v. Gerald Andrew Darby, No. 2:16cr36 (E.D. Va. June 16, 2016).
67.
Motion of the United States for Voluntary Dismissal of its Appeal at 3-4, United
States v. Michaud, No. 16-30163 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2016).
68.
Government’s Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice at 2,
United States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2017).
69.
Mozilla’s Motion to Intervene or Appear as Amicus Curiae in Relation to Government’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Order on the Third Motion to Compel, United
States v. Jay Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351RJB (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2016).
70.
Id. at 1.
71.
Id. at 7 n. 9.
72.
See Seung Lee, FBI Doesn’t Have to Give Mozilla Details On Bug It Used to Bust a
Child Porn Ring, NEWSWEEK (May 18, 2016, 6:22 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/fbidoesnt-have-give-mozilla-details-bug-it-used-bust-child-porn-ring-461325.
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weight behind efforts to reform the VEP and create legislation to guide the
73
process.
The issues that arose in Michaud illustrate how government uses of
software vulnerabilities can stretch beyond national security and how the
secretive way the government has chosen to deal with vulnerabilities can
cost it convictions in criminal cases. Whenever vulnerabilities are exploited
to gain evidence in a criminal case, the government runs the risk of hitting
the same wall it did in Michaud. Defendants will argue that information
about the vulnerability is material to their defense, leaving the government
74
to “disclose or dismiss.” This opens the door to a version of what is called
“graymail” in national security prosecutions—a situation where a potential
criminal defendant threatens to expose sensitive classified information if
75
they are prosecuted. Though the exact decision-making process behind the
choice has yet to come to light, when the government refuses to release information on a vulnerability, they are making a choice: secrecy over law enforcement.

III. Making New Vulnerabilities—Backdoors and
San Bernardino
For decades the government has sought to create vulnerabilities where
there once were none—all in the name of national security. These software
“backdoors”—intentional weaknesses in a piece of technology or soft76
ware—are designed to allow authorities to bypass security features. The
recent boom in encryption capabilities has led some in the government to
call for controls on just how secure a developer can make their product, lest
77
they prevent law enforcement from gaining access. While discussions of
encryption are not always directly connected to discussions of vulnerability
disclosure, history and recent events show that many of the same issues
arise in the context of backdoors.
The first major battle over encryption backdoors came in the 1990s, a
period that has come to be known in technology policy circles as the “Cryp-

73.
See Denelle Dixon, Improving Internet Security Through Vulnerability Disclosure,
MOZILLA BLOG (May 17, 2017), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2017/05/17/improving-internetsecurity-vulnerability-disclosure/.
74.
Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investigative Techniques, LAWFARE (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM),
https://lawfareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques.
75.
Arjun Chandran, Note, The Classified Information Procedures Act in the Age of
Terrorism: Remodeling CIPA in an Offense-Specific Manner, 64 DUKE L.J. 1411, 1415
(2015).
76.
See Lisa A. Hayes, Strong Encryption Wins Again, Time to End the Debate on
Government Backdoors, CDT (Mar. 29, 2016), https://cdt.org/blog/strong-encryption-winsagain-time-to-end-the-debate-on-government-backdoors/.
77.
See, e.g., Comey, supra note 20.
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to Wars.” In 1993, with personal computers and the internet proliferating
at an ever-increasing rate, the Clinton administration announced the creation
of the “Clipper Chip,” a microchip intended to be inserted into consumer
79
telephones. The chip was promised to provide consumers with secure encrypted communications while preserving government access to unencrypt80
ed versions of those communications. The chip worked by requiring two
separate cryptographic keys to decrypt any communication, a style of sys81
tem known as “key escrow.” These keys would be held by two separate
government agencies, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) and the Treasury Department, who would only release those keys to
82
law enforcement with “lawful authorization.” Industry groups moved
quickly to criticize the proposal, as did civil liberties organizations. While
the proposal did not require industry to include the chips in their devices,
many in industry saw the move as the first step toward greater restrictions
83
on encryption in the future. By 1994, public opinion was against the chip
84
as well, with a CNN/TIME poll finding 80% of Americans opposed. The
chip was finally killed when, later that year, a computer scientist was able to
demonstrate that with a “brute force” attack, a user could override the technology that allowed law enforcement to surveil communications using the
85
chip—making the backdoor useless. For the time being, it seemed, encryption was protected.
The current debate over encryption and government backdoors is part of
the greater debate over government surveillance launched by Edward
Snowden’s 2013 exposure of expansive NSA surveillance programs. The
reaction by the tech industry was almost immediate—in 2014 Google and
Apple both introduced default encryption in their smartphone operating sys86
tems. At the same time, law enforcement and intelligence agencies began
to once again broach the subject of limitations on encryption. In an October
16, 2014 speech at the Brookings Institute, then FBI Director James Comey
spoke about such limits, saying that the FBI often had “the legal authority to
intercept and access communications and information pursuant to court or87
ders,” but “often lacked the technical ability to do so.” He went on to say
that the FBI needed “assistance and cooperation from companies to comply
with lawful court orders,” and that the private sector needed to “take a step
back,” pause, and “consider changing course” when it came to ever78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

KEHL ET AL., supra note 18, at 1.
Id. at 5.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Miller, supra note 19.
Comey, supra note 20.
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88

increasing encryption. A few months later, then NSA Director Mike Rogers, in a question-and-answer session with technology policy experts, supported the creation of built-in government access, saying backdoors would
not “fatally compromise encryption” or limit international markets for US
89
products (two major concerns of backdoor opponents). Despite such highlevel discussions, it would take a tragic mass shooting to bring the debate
into the public consciousness.

A. Apple, the FBI, and San Bernardino
On December 2, 2015, a married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and
Tashfeen Malik, attacked a holiday party in San Bernardino, California, killing 14 people. Farook and Malik were killed by the police after a high-speed
90
chase. Amongst the evidence collected by the FBI in the aftermath of the
shooting was Farook’s employer-issued iPhone, which had been locked with
91
a numeric passcode. One of the iPhone’s built-in security features, an autoerase function, had also been enabled, which would destroy the encryption
key after 10 failed attempts to unlock the device, rendering the information
92
on the phone forever inaccessible. In an effort to recover any information
that could be on the phone, the FBI sought a court order to compel Apple to
93
create for it a custom piece of software to circumvent the phone’s security.
The program would reboot the phone while bypassing or disabling the autoerase function, allowing the FBI to then use another program to rapidly
94
guess the passcode. A federal magistrate granted the order, though Apple
appealed, beginning a very public legal battle between the company and the
95
government. In its motion to vacate the order, Apple rebuked the government’s claim that this was a one-time request, and argued that they believed
96
the backdoor the order would create was “too dangerous to build.” Indeed,
88.
Id.
89.
McCarthy, supra note 21.
90.
Richard Winton, We May Never Know Why the San Bernardino Terrorists Targeted a Christmas Party. Here’s What We Do Know, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2016, 7:55 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-san-bernardino-attack-20161202-story.html.
91.
Government’s Ex Parte Application for Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist
Agents in Search; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 1-2, In the Matter of the Search
of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus
IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2016).
92.
Id. at 3.
93.
See id.
94.
See id.
95.
See Tracey Lien et al., Court Order in San Bernardino Case Could Force Apple to
Jeopardize Phone Security, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016, 1:54 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-apple-san-bernardino-security-20160217-story.html; Jonathan Chew,
This is Apple’s Next Move in Its Fight With the FBI, FORTUNE, (March 2, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/03/02/apple-appeal-fbi-iphone.
96.
See Apple Inc.’s Motion to Vacate Order Compelling Apple Inc. to Assist Agents
in Search, And Opposition to Government’s Motion to Compel Assistance at 2, In the Matter
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at the same time the government was seeking Apple’s assistance in the San
Bernardino case, it was also attempting to get the company to unlock at least
97
nine other iPhones in unrelated cases. Apple’s CEO Tim Cook signaled
that the company intended to fight the issue for as long as it could, and expressed concern that the order was an overreach of government power that
would undermine “the very freedoms and liberty” that the government was
98
meant to protect. In response, the government filed a motion to compel, in
99
which it accused Apple of opposing the order as a publicity stunt. Despite
these heated words, a little over a month after Apple filed its appeal, the
100
government dropped the issue entirely. The FBI, in cooperation with a
third party, had been able to circumvent the iPhone’s security and thus no
longer needed the order. In a statement the US Attorney, Eileen Decker, was
emphatic that the “decision to conclude the litigation was based solely on
the fact that, with the assistance of a third party, we are now able to unlock
101
that iPhone without compromising any information in the phone.” It was
later revealed that the FBI had paid a computer security expert $900,000 to
102
crack the phone’s encryption. In April of 2016 the FBI released a further
statement where they said they would not submit the vulnerability used to
access the phone to the VEP, because it had been discovered by a third party, and the FBI had not purchased “the rights to technical details about how
the method functions, or the nature and extent of any vulnerability upon
103
which the method may rely in order to operate.” Later attempts by the
media to force the FBI to release more detailed information about the vulnerability finally failed in October of 2017, when a federal judge dismissed

of the Search of an Apple iPhone Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black
Lexus IS300, California License Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016).
97.
Eric Lichtblau & Joseph Goldstein, Apple Faces U.S. Demand to Unlock 9 More
iPhones,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/02/24/technology/justice-department-wants-apple-to-unlock-nine-moreiphones.html?rref=collection%2Fnewseventcollection%2Fapple-fbi-case.
98.
See Tim Cook, A Message to Our Customers, APPLE (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.apple.com/customer-letter/.
99.
Kate Knibbs, Feds Say Apple’s Stand Against the FBI Is Just a PR Stunt, GIZMODO
(Feb. 19, 2016, 2:42 PM), https://gizmodo.com/the-doj-is-going-in-hard-on-apple-aboutunlocking-that-1760141290.
100.
Government’s Status Report at 1-2, In the Matter of the Search of an Apple iPhone
Seized During the Execution of a Search Warrant on a Black Lexus IS300, California License
Plate 35KGD203, No. 15-0451M (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016).
101.
Joel Rubin et al., FBI Unlocks San Bernardino Shooter’s iPhone and Ends Legal
Battle with Apple, for Now, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016, 10:39 PM), http://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-fbi-drops-fight-to-force-apple-to-unlock-san-bernardino-terroristiphone-20160328-story.html.
102.
Matt Novak, The FBI Paid $900,000 to Unlock the San Bernardino Terrorist’s
iPhone, GIZMODO (May 8, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://gizmodo.com/the-fbi-paid-900-000-tounlock-the-san-bernardino-kill-1795010203.
103.
Don Reisinger, FBI: Sorry, But We’re Keeping the iPhone Crack Secret, FORTUNE
(Apr. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/fbi-apple-iphone-crack/.
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the FOIA lawsuit, upholding the FBI’s claim that revealing the identity of
the vendor could lead to that entity being attacked and could lead to the un104
authorized disclosure of the vulnerability, damaging national security.
The San Bernardino case illuminates not only the debate over backdoors but also the limits of the VEP. Unlike the issues surrounding
WannaCry or Heartbleed, where the vulnerabilities remained mostly secret
until exploited by bad actors or exposed by whistleblowers, this vulnerability was publicly known and clearly effective—at least effective enough for
the government to drop their case against Apple once it became available.
Yet, despite knowing there was a potentially dangerous and exploitable error in the iPhone’s encryption software, the FBI was able to stop the vulnerability from even entering the VEP.

IV. Proposed Solutions—The New VEP,
Legislation, and Beyond
Given the myriad of competing interests and agendas involved in the
debate over vulnerability disclosure (as well as the debate over government
backdoors), any proposal to move the conversation forward faces a difficult
fight. Any solution has to appease both government agencies looking to preserve investigative and tactical capabilities and companies seeking to protect their products and customers. Given how central computer systems are
to the functioning of society, vulnerabilities will remain dangerous and valuable for the foreseeable future, making any resolution that even partially
satisfies the parties involved something worth pursuing. In recent years
there have been proposals from many corners, including the Executive
Branch, Congress, and technology policy advocates from both civil society
and industry, and an evaluation of these proposals is vital in any attempt to
plot a future course.

A. A New VEP
As part of the fallout from the Heartbleed incident, some security researchers raised the alarm about the need for public disclosure of vulnerabilities discovered by the government. After reviewing various government
operations that exploited vulnerabilities, it became clear to them the government was sitting on a worrisome stockpile—why else would the government be willing to “burn” four zero-day vulnerabilities in a single mission, as was done in the Stuxnet attack, a joint US/Israeli cyber assault on
105
the Iranian nuclear program? Once used, zero-day vulnerabilities would
most likely become public and, therefore, patched in short order, so it
seemed unlikely the government would expend them so readily if its stock104.
105.

See Associated Press v. FBI, 265 F. Supp. 3d 82, 94 (D.D.C. 2017).
See Schneier, supra note 1.
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106

pile was extremely limited. Yet the government denied the existence of
any stockpile and maintained that not disclosing a vulnerability was the ex107
ception, not the rule for the government. In an interview with Wired, National Security Council cybersecurity coordinator Michael Daniel avoided
directly answering the question of whether that default rule extended to zero-day vulnerabilities discovered by third parties, saying that if the government thought it was a significant threat, it would move to get the vulnerabil108
ity patched.
In 2017, in the wake of the 2010 VEP document’s release and in response to the WannaCry attack, voices in civil society and the technology
industry launched another round of calls for further action on vulnerabili109
110
ties. Industry players like Mozilla and Microsoft, both of which had
seen the negative aspects of government use of vulnerabilities, cited the
WannaCry attack as impetus for changes in policy. Microsoft went as far as
to call for a “Digital Geneva Convention” that would bind world govern111
ments to report vulnerabilities. Similar calls for reform came from civil
society groups like EFF, which pushed for Congressional action (discussed
112
further below). In October of 2017 the White House Cybersecurity Coordinator Rob Joyce announced that the White House was preparing to release
new information on the VEP, leading to the release of an updated VEP on
113
November 15, 2017.
The updated VEP provides greater detail on the considerations that go
into cases where law enforcement or intelligence interests override the benefits of disclosure. The new policy includes a series of “core considerations”
that are supplied to help decision makers “weigh the benefits to U.S. national security and national interest” when deciding whether or not to disclose
or rescript knowledge of a vulnerability. These considerations are:

106.
See id.
107.
Kim Zetter, U.S. Gov Insists It Doesn’t Stockpile Zero-Day Exploits to Hack Enemies, WIRED (Nov. 17, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/michael-daniel-nozero-day-stockpile/.
108.
Se id.
109.
See Denelle Dixon, WannaCry is a Cry for VEP Reform, MOZILLA BLOG (May 15,
2017), https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2017/05/15/wannacry-cry-vep-reform/.
110.
Smith, supra note 54.
111.
Brad Smith, The Need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT: MICROSOFT
ON THE ISSUES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/02/14/needdigital-geneva-convention/#sm.0001gnysbhjsod01z7q11hvz0xg2d.
112.
See, e.g., Andrew Crocker & Kate Tummarello, Congress’ Imperfect Start to
Addressing
Vulnerabilities,
EFF
(May
24,
2017),
https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2017/05/congress-imperfect-start-addressing-vulnerabilities.
113.
2017 VEP, supra note 17; Michelle Richardson & Mike Godwin, What the White
House Needs to Disclose About Its Process for Revealing Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities, JUST
SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/46647/white-house-disclose-processrevealing-cybersecurity-vulnerabilities/.

Michigan Technology Law Review

122

[Vol. 25:105

Part 1—Defensive Equity Considerations
1. A. Threat Considerations
x
x
x

Where is the product used? How widely is it used?
How broad is the range of products or versions affected?
Are threat actors likely to exploit this vulnerability, if it were
known to them?

1. B. Vulnerability Considerations
x
x
x

What access must a threat actor possess to exploit this vulnerability?
Is exploitation of this vulnerability alone sufficient to cause
harm?
How likely is it that threat actors will discover or acquire
knowledge of this vulnerability?

1. C. Impact Considerations
x
x
x
x

x

How much do users rely on the security of the product?
How severe is the vulnerability? What are the potential consequences of the exploitation of this vulnerability?
What access or benefit does a threat actor gain by exploiting
this vulnerability?
What is the likelihood that adversaries will reverse engineer a
patch, discover the vulnerability and use it against unpatched
systems?
Will enough USG [United States Government] information
systems, U.S. businesses and/or consumers actually install the
patch to offset the harm to security caused by educating attackers about the vulnerability?

1. D. Mitigation Considerations
x

x

x

x

Can the product be configured to mitigate this vulnerability?
Do other mechanisms exist to mitigate the risks from this vulnerability?
Are impacts of this vulnerability mitigated by existing best practice guidance, standard configurations, or security practices?
If the vulnerability is disclosed, how likely is it that the vendor
or another entity will develop and release a patch or update that
effectively mitigates it?
If a patch or update is released, how likely is it to be applied to
vulnerable systems? How soon? What percentage of vulnerable
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systems will remain forever unpatched or unpatched for more
than a year after the patch is released?
Can exploitation of this vulnerability by threat actors be detected by USG or other members of the defensive community?
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Part 2—Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and
Operational Equity Considerations
2. A. Operational Value Considerations
x

x

x
x

Can this vulnerability be exploited to support intelligence collection, cyber operations, or law enforcement evidence collection?
What is the demonstrated value of this vulnerability for intelligence collection, cyber operations, and/or law enforcement evidence collection?
What is its potential (future) value?
What is the operational effectiveness of this vulnerability?

2. B. Operational Impact Considerations
x

Does exploitation of this vulnerability provide specialized operational value against cyber threat actors or their operations?
Against high-priority National Intelligence Priorities Framework (NIPF) or military targets? For protection of warfighters
or civilians?

x

Do alternative means exist to realize the operational benefits of
exploiting this vulnerability?
Would disclosing this vulnerability reveal any intelligence
sources or methods?

x

Part 3—Commercial Equity Considerations
x

If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed,
what risks could that pose for USG relationships with industry?

Part 4—International Partnership Equity Considerations
x

If USG knowledge of this vulnerability were to be revealed,
114
what risks could that pose for USG international relations?

This list is much more extensive than what was included in the White
House’s 2014 statement, and the new VEP has received positive, if re-

114.

Id.
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115

strained, reviews from groups like the ACLU. The new policy still exempts vulnerabilities that are subject to non-disclosure agreements—which
are common in cases dealing with third-party discovered vulnerabilities (as
116
in the San Bernardino case). Likewise, the Equities Review Board, while
including civilian departments like the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Commerce, excludes both the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
117
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). This is notable, given the
FCC’s role in regulating the nation’s telecommunications infrastructure and
118
the FTC’s mission to protect privacy and data security. Given the increasing attention paid to connected vehicles, the Department of Transportation
119
would seem to be a natural fit for a permanent seat on the board as well.
Yet even with these criticisms, some of the changes to the VEP were close
120
to those requested by civil society organizations, though time will tell if
the VEP can deliver the outcomes those organizations desire when put into
practice.

B. Congressional Fixes
Both the previous VEP and its 2017 version are products of the executive branch. Yet after the WannaCry attack, Congress began to take interest
in the process—starting with the “Protect our Ability to Counter Hacking
121
Act” (PATCH Act). The PATCH Act would codify the VEP process and
122
the Equities Review Board (ERB). Unlike the 2017 VEP, the act would
put the Secretary of Homeland Security, rather than the Director of the
NSA, in charge of the ERB, though it only gives seats to the Secretaries of
State, Treasury, and Energy, as well as to representatives of the FTC, on an
123
as-needed basis. The PATCH Act would also place the ERB under yearly
Congressional oversight, via a yearly report to the relevant committees, and
require unclassified public versions of that report to be released. The
115.
Jennifer Stisa Granick, Trump’s New Cybersecurity Rules Are Better Than
Obama’s, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Nov. 27, 2017, 9:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/
blog/privacy-technology/internet-privacy/trumps-new-cybersecurity-rules-are-better-obamas.
116.
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121.
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PATCH Act also gained support from Mozilla, who found that the act included many of the key reforms to the VEP system that it had been pushing
124
for.
While civil society organizations and industry were encouraged by the
introduction of the PATCH Act, they also had reservations. The EFF took
exception to the exclusion from the VEP of classified vulnerabilities that are
“inappropriately released to the public,” which would allow the government
125
to keep vulnerabilities like Heartbleed secret even after a public leak. Further criticism was directed at the fact that, like the 2017 VEP, the PATCH
126
Act also excluded third-party discovered vulnerabilities. Despite the attention paid to the act by industry and advocates, the Act, though introduced in
127
May of 2017, has yet to move any further through the legislative process.

V. A Hybrid Solution to the Vulnerability Disclosure Issue
Given the flurry of activity and debate over vulnerability disclosures
over the past few years, there are a number of viable solutions to the issue
that could be attractive to industry, government, and advocates alike. However, given the diversity in thought among those groups, and the differing
weight they give to considerations of national security, keeping private,
governmental, and civil society actors engaged in active policy-making, it
becomes difficult to create an effective final policy. A solid foundation for
the new vulnerability disclosure schema can be found in the 2017 VEP and
the PATCH Act. As discussed in Part III, both of these received a mix of
praise and criticism from players in the technology policy world, and thus
any new system derived from the PATCH Act or the 2017 VEP will be a
creature of compromise.
The PATCH Act represents the most important aspect of any VEP reform—the codification of the process into law. Rather than depending on
the Executive Branch to write its own rules for vulnerabilities, Congress
needs to be involved. The PATCH Act’s oversight requirements of yearly
reports, including public reports, will ensure the process is kept under a
watchful eye. A useful addition, first proposed in a 2016 paper by two former Obama Administration cybersecurity officers and included in the
PATCH Act, is further oversight by the Inspector General of the given department charged with chairing the ERB, along with expanding the mission
of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), which is already tasked with reviewing the actions of intelligence agencies, to include
124.
Dixon, supra note 73.
125.
See Crocker & Tummarello, supra note 112.
126.
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127.
Actions Overview S.1157 — 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1157/actions?q=
%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22s+1157%22%5D%7D&r=1 (last visited Dec. 20, 2017).
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oversight of the VEP. Given the sensitive nature of the VEP’s operations,
oversight by a group like PCLOB allows for a level of operational secrecy
while still ensuring independent oversight.
The 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act each structure the ERB differently,
and a hybrid of the two is needed to better address current differences. The
2017 VEP’s membership list should serve as the basis, as it includes important civilian departments like State, Treasury, and Commerce. Additionally, representatives from the FCC and FTC should be granted permanent
seats on the board, given the missions and expertise of those agencies. The
PATCH Act’s transfer of the Executive Secretariat from the NSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is a vital change from the VEP, as
DHS has significant experience and expertise in coordinated vulnerability
disclosure programs (which evolved from the work of CERT-CC, men129
tioned above). This also takes control of the board out of the hands of an
agency dedicated to intelligence gathering and puts it into the hands of
DHS, an agency tasked with a wider portfolio of interests.
While it is not necessary to codify the exact criteria for evaluating vulnerabilities, the equity considerations found in the 2017 VEP should provide
the base of the ERB’s thought process. Those considerations touch on a
wide swath of the issues the ERB will have to face, including:
x
x
x
x
x

Details on the product in question—the extent of its use and
who might exploit the vulnerability if it became known;
How likely it is that other actors will discover the vulnerability
and exploit it;
The severity of the threat and the potential to mitigate the vulnerability;
The value of the vulnerability as a law enforcement or intelligence tool; and
The effect the revelation of US government knowledge of the
vulnerability will have on US government relationships with
industry and international relationships.

These are deeply important questions in any discussion of vulnerability disclosure and need to be part of any hybrid VEP/PATCH system.
Controls over any stockpiling of vulnerabilities will also be a necessary
component of a hybrid solution. Both the 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act
provide for periodic review of those vulnerabilities that are chosen to be
kept secret—with the VEP adopting yearly review. Yet both the 2017 VEP
and the PATCH Act allow the government to circumvent the VEP process
128.
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when the vulnerability is subject to a non-disclosure agreement (as in San
Bernardino) or when the vulnerability’s existence is made public via a leak
of information (as in WannaCry). These provisions must be eliminated from
the proposed hybrid solution. When a third party approaches the government with a vulnerability, the government should be compelled to run that
vulnerability through the VEP. A strong VEP has the potential to increase
confidence in the government’s ability to responsibly handle vulnerabilities,
and allowing it to be circumvented via non-disclosure agreements derails
that progress. Likewise, once a vulnerability is made public via a leak or a
cyber-attack, the ERB should move to release what information they have to
any government agency working to repair the damage or reveal the vulnerability to private companies whose products are under threat. It is clear from
the lessons of Heartbleed and WannaCry that continued government secrecy
after a vulnerability becomes public does not end well for the government,
especially in the court of public opinion.
Any move to reform vulnerability disclosures would be a complicated
process involving many more interests and actors than those discussed
above. But a hybrid of the 2017 VEP and the PATCH Act has the opportunity to bridge the gap between government and private interests, and allow
for greater public confidence in the vulnerability disclosure process. While
the PATCH Act has not made progress in the current Congress, the implementation of the new VEP gives supporters of vulnerability disclosure reform another opportunity to raise awareness of the issue and push for further
changes.

C. Other Considerations
While not directly implicated in the VEP or PATCH Act, there are two
additional areas of interest that could prove useful as leverage in a debate
over vulnerability disclosure reform. The first is the use of vulnerabilities in
criminal cases, as in the Playpen investigation. In Michaud, the government
effectively decided that a set of software vulnerabilities were more important than the successful prosecution of defendants who had been found to
be in possession of child pornography. In a 2016 article, Susan Hennessey,
an expert in national security law and former NSA attorney, along with
Nicholas Weaver, a computer security expert and UC Berkeley lecturer,
proposed a new judicial framework for NITs that included in camera review
130
of classified information. Hennessey and Weaver’s proposal is worthy of
deeper investigation in a different discussion, but for the purposes of vulnerability disclosure reform, it presents an opportunity to clear up the issues
surrounding NIT cases, retaining them as a viable law enforcement tool,
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which could entice law enforcement agencies to support reforms to the VEP
131
which they may otherwise not favor.
The second area of potential leverage to build support for vulnerability
disclosure is the reform of the laws that govern security research. Currently,
third-party researchers, be they individual white hat hackers or universitysponsored teams of students, have the potential to run afoul of the CFAA,
which has never been amended to give a good faith research exception to its
132
prohibition on accessing a computer “without authorization.” Such a
change would further open up the world of vulnerability research and give
both companies and the government access to new sources of vulnerability
discovery. Laws like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) also
have the potential to derail good faith security research, when they bar circumventing things like access controls on devices, even by the owners of
133
said devices. Changes to these laws can help protect consumers and could
even take some pressure off of the government to reveal every vulnerability–since there will be an army of researchers also looking for them.

Conclusion
In modern society, software vulnerabilities have become a fact of life.
Data breaches, malware attacks, and the like have become common news
134
stories, and often have real-world implications. It is easy to understand
why law enforcement and intelligence agencies would want to exploit these
vulnerabilities for their own missions, but such actions will always come at
a cost. The government’s ability to hide vulnerabilities from developers is a
threat not only to the security of American citizens, but the security of millions of users across the world. Reform of the vulnerability disclosure
scheme is the best opportunity for the government to lead on this issue—and
by bringing advocates and industry into the fold on designing a new system
they can preserve national security utility without sacrificing the best interest of the public.
131.
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